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Abstract
We eliminate scale effects in the Balanced Growth Path of an expanding-variety endogenous growth
model using the concept of entropy as a complexity effect. This allows us to gradually diminish scale-
effects as the economy develops along the transitional dynamics, which conciliates evidence of the
existence of scale effects long ago in history with evidence for no scale effects in today’s economies.
We show that empirical evidence supports entropy as a stylized form of the complexity effect. Then
we show that the model can replicate well the take-off after the industrial revolution. Finally, we show
that a model with both network effects (as spillovers in R&D) and entropy (as complexity effects) can
replicate the main facts of the very long-run evolution of the economy since A.D. 1. Future scenarios
may help to explain (part of) the growth crises affecting the current generation.
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1 Introduction
Endogenous growth theorists have debated the existence of a scale effect of the population on the per
capita GDP growth rate since its emergence. In fact, in the first examples of R&D-led endogenous
growth models (Grossmann and Helpman, 1990; Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), GDP per
capita growth depended on the population level, implying that more populated countries would grow
more than less populated countries, which is clearly rejected by current empirical cross-country evidence.
However, historical examples long before the industrial revolution indicated that the level of population
and connections between civilizations may determine the economic growth of those civilizations (e.g.
Kremer, 1993). On the theoretical ground, the evolution of endogenous growth theory had made efforts
to eliminate the so-called scale effects (Jones, 1999). Until now, the empirical contradiction on the
existence of the scale effects between the today’s evidence and historical evidence has not been completely
incorporated into the economic growth literature. We fill this gap. As a first step, we infer a time-
varying state-dependent complexity effect from the data. The next step is to find and calibrate a function
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that approximates the time series inferred from the data reasonably well. We motivate a closed-form
specification for the complexity effect by deriving it from the concept of generalized entropy, as a measure
of disorder, redundancy or diversity.
In the context of an endogenous growth model of horizontal R&D, complexity rises as the economy
develops and increases the number of varieties of capital (technological) goods. Indeed, complexity may be
understood as a process. Economies at earlier stages of development are characterized by relatively simple
production methods and a limited availability of specialized inputs, in a context in which the diversity of
human activities and of produced goods and services is low (Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). We argue
that economies at these stages may display distinct market sizes, namely due to different population sizes,
but are characterized altogether by similar low degrees of complexity. As such, innovation (or adoption)
costs due to complexity effects are small and market size exerts no significant influence on them.
Complexity rises as the economy develops and increases the diversity of its activities. In developed
economies production industries make extensive use of highly specialized inputs and have access to a wide
variety of producer services, such as equipment repair and maintenance, transportation and communica-
tion services, engineering and legal supports, accounting, advertising, and financial services (see Ciccone
and Matsuyama, 1996, and the extensive references therein). At this stage we expect the innovation
costs due to complexity effects to be significant and become roughly proportional to market size. Thus,
formally, we consider that complexity, though time-varying, is not a direct function of time but is state
dependent, where the state of the economy is given by the number of varieties. This allows us to obtain
scale-effects during the transition path which gradually decrease through time and eventually vanish in
the steady state.
We contribute to the literature in two main issues: (1) bring the concept of entropy to model the
complexity effect in the endogenous growth theory; (2) use the model with a complexity effect mod-
elled through entropy to replicate both the take-off from the industrial revolution and the very long-run
evolution of the economy since A.D. 1.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to the removal of the
scale effects in endogenous growth theory and motivates the use of entropy functions to approximate the
time-varying state-dependent complexity effect. Section 3 presents empirical motivation that allows us to
infer the complexity effect from the data and calibrate the time-varying complexity effect. Then, Section
4 presents the model, its steady-state and transitional dynamics. Section 5 presents the quantitative
simulation of the model for the take-off since the Industrial Revolution. Section 6 incorporates time-
varying spillovers in the R&D production function and simulates the evolution of the economy since A.D.
1. In Sections 5 and 6 we provide a discussion of the results in the light of historical evidence. Finally,
Section 7 draws conclusions and also highlights possible lines for further research.
2 Literature Review
2.1 R&D market complexity effect and the removal of scale effects on growth
A strand of the endogenous-growth literature has considered a market complexity effect in R&D activities
as a mechanism for the elimination of the scale effects on growth along the Balanced Growth Path – BGP
(e.g., Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1999, 2000; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Etro, 2008; Gil et al., 2013).
Scale effects on growth are removed by considering a complexity effect in R&D such that the difficulty
of introducing new products and replacing old ones is proportional to the market size measured by the
absolute level of output attributable to the product targeted by R&D: the larger the latter, the greater
the costs necessary to discover, develop and market the associated technology e.g., costs pertaining to
the construction of prototypes and samples, new assembly lines and training of workers, and generic
coordination, organizational and transportation costs.
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These complexity costs offset the positive effect of scale on the (expected) profits of the successful
innovator. In this way, scale variables like the level of the population do not influence the BGP growth
rate because the probability of research success is also independent of those variables. This assumption
guarantees that spending on R&D increases at the same rate as output and, thereby, allows us to establish
a (BGP) relationship between a constant R&D to output ratio and a constant economic growth rate, as
seems to be the case empirically.
As shown by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), this approach can be interpreted as a reduced form
of the mechanism considered in the models by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Peretto (1998), Howitt
(1999) and Li (2000), among others, in which the removal of scale effects explicitly relies on the combination
of vertical and horizontal R&D: the scale effect of rising population is offset by the growth of the number
of varieties of products (through horizontal innovation) that fragments the growing demand for these
products, thus preventing the reward to any specific product innovation from rising with population.
This mechanism allows for the removal of scale effects while preserving the fully-endogenous growth result
of the first-generation endogenous growth models (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and
is in contrast to the semi-endogenous growth result obtained by considering decreasing returns to the
accumulated knowledge stock, as in, e.g., Jones (1995) and Segerstrom (1998). Over time the empirical
literature has presented evidence more supportive of the fully-endogenous growth models than of the
semi-endogenous approach (e.g., Dinopoulos and Thompson, 2000; Zachariadis, 2003; Laincz and Peretto,
2006; Ha and Howitt, 2007; Madsen, 2008; Sedgley and Elmslie, 2010; Ang and Madsen, 2015).
However, in spite of the modern evidence against scale effects on growth, there are compelling argu-
ments for scale effects from historical evidence (e.g., Kremer, 1993). The dichotomy between historical
and modern evidence on scale effects may be addressed from the point of view of deviations from the
BGP. Observe that even in the already cited non-scale models, scale effects may still be present along the
transition path. Transitional dynamics for the semi-endogenous and the fully-endogenous specifications
have been analyzed by, e.g., Jones (1995) and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), respectively. But a
key question concerns the persistence of deviations from the BGP and, specifically, whether the speed of
adjustment back to the BGP is sufficiently slow to reveal scale effects over long periods of time.
Alternatively, it may be recognized that the complexity effect in R&D activities may be large enough
to eliminate the scale effects in modern fully-developed economies, but may be small or non-existent in
transition economies. We motivate the existence of a time-varying state-dependent complexity effect that
increases with the economies’ level of development by deriving it from the concept of generalized entropy.
2.2 A theoretic foundation of a time-varying complexity effect
Although the concept of entropy originated in Thermodynamics – commonly understood as a measure of
molecular disorder within a macroscopic system – and its statistical definition was developed in Statistical
Mechanics, it has been adapted and extended by other fields of study, including Information Theory,
Biology, and Economics. As such, several indices have been created to measure entropy: examples are
the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy index and the Tsallis entropy index (a generalization of Boltzmann-Gibbs)
as a measure of uncertainty in Statistical Mechanics (e.g., Tsallis, 1988); the Shannon index as a measure
of redundancy in Information Theory (Shannon, 1948); the Patil and Taillie index (equivalent to the
Tsallis index) as a measure of diversity in Biology (Patil and Taillie, 1982); and the Atkinson index (a
transformation of a generalized entropy index) as a measure of income inequality in Economics (Atkinson,
1970).
A widely used family of entropy indices based on the contributions by Tsallis, and Patil and Taillie, is
usually written in the form
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Sq =

1−∑Wi=1 pqi
q−1 , q != 1
−∑Wi=1 pilnpi , q = 1 , (1)
where pi is the probability of state i, W is the number of states, and q is a non-negative parameter. Sq
represents a parametric family of indices labeled by q, with some limiting values representing well-known
indices that measure biological diversity or informational redundancy. For instance, with q = 1, one
recovers the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy and the Shannon entropy indices as a special case of the Tsallis
index. In general, each specific application of the index Sq requires the determination of a particular value
of q.
If the distribution is uniform, such that, e.g., all the messages in the message space or the biological
varieties (species) in the variety space are equiprobable, p = 1/W , the entropy is maximized and Sq
becomes
Sq =
 1−W
1−q
q−1 , q != 1
lnW , q = 1
, (2)
The entropy indices may also be computed up to a constant of proportionality (in Thermodynamics this
is known as the Boltzmann constant).
Adapting to an R&D production function, entropy as a measure of disorder, redundancy, or diver-
sity captures the essence of the complexity effect in R&D put forward by the fully-endogenous growth
literature. In the context of our model the number of states is represented by the number of varieties of
technological goods, A, such that
(1 + ψ)(At+1 −At) = δ · (At) ·
LAt
L
χ(At)
t
, (3)
using ψ as a measure of creative destruction as in Jones and Williams (2000), LAt is the amount of labor
allocated to R&D activities, Lt is total amount of labor in the economy, and χ(A) is the time-varying
state-dependent complexity effect. There are two sectors in the economy and consequently labor may be
allocated to the R&D sector or to the final-good sector, which will be described below.
Considering p = 1/A, we obtain
Sq(At) =
b
1−A1−qt
q−1 , q != 1
blnAt , q = 1
, (4)
with b being the equivalent to the Boltzmann constant. We will consider χ(At) as
χ(At) = max {0, Sq(At)} . (5)
Equation (5) means that the definition of entropy given by the Tsallis index may be used to write the
complexity effect χ(At) as a positive and concave function of the technological level At. Figure 1 shows
a graphical representation of equation (5).
The following lemma shows that there is a specific combination of the parameters of the entropy
function in equation (5) for which χ(At) converges to 1.
Lemma 1. With q > 1, then χ(At) converges to
b
q−1 . Thus for b = q− 1, χ(At) converges to 1 as A goes
to infinity. With q ≤ 1 then χ(At) converges to +∞.
Proof. Calculate limA→+∞χ(At) for q > 1 and q ≤ 1 in equation (4), respectively.
In the next section we will show that this theoretical foundation for the complexity effect can reasonably
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Figure 1: χ(A) function for different intervals of q
match the empirical series, given the available data.1
3 Empirical Motivation for complexity effect using entropy
Let ∆At+1 = At+1 −At in (3). By applying logs and solving for χ, we have the recursive equation:
χ =
lnδ − ln(1 + ψ) + lnAt + lnLAt − ln(∆At+1)
lnLt
To obtain estimates for χ over time, we consider the calibrated values of δ and the time series data
for A, LA and L. We have used total labor force for L between 1950 and 2000, from the Penn World
Tables (PWT) 8.1. For the number of workers employed in R&D (LA) we used the Number of Full-Time-
Equivalent (FTE) R&D scientists and engineers in R&D-performing companies from the National Science
Foundation. Finally for A, we use a TFP index (with the 2005 level equalized to 100) inferred from the
(per capita) production function yt = (At)
σ(lYt )
1−αkαt , using output per worker for yt and physical capital
per worker for kt (from the Penn World Tables 8.1), with parameters α = 0.36 (share of physical capital
in GDP) and σ (returns to specialization, i.e. the measure of the social benefit from innovations) being
0.196 or 0.64 in different exercises and ψ = 1.648 (creative destruction) (values taken from Jones and
Williams, 2000: Table 2). Finally note that in the model workers are allocated either to the final-good
production or to the R&D labs, so we infer the ratio of workers in the production sector to total labor
1We have tested other functions to adjust to the complexity effect. However, due to the matching between the concept
of entropy and the difficulty or complexity effect in R&D, as well as due to the flexibility of the entropy function, we
introduce this concept into the endogenous growth theory. Moreover, we show that it not only matches empirical series for
the complexity effect, but also allows for historical plausible evolution of the economy in the long run.
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force lYt using the data for L
A and L already mentioned above. The parameter δ is adjusted such that we
obtain a steady-state growth rate in the model of 1.87%.2 The resulting series are plotted in Figure 2.3
Also in the same Figure 2, we plot the theoretical adjustment to the empirical function using the
definition of entropy in (5). We adjust b and q such that we obtain a reasonable adjustment between
the theoretical and the empirical series. We can observe that we obtain very reasonable adjustment
between the empirical series (for the lengthier time series available) and our theoretical formulation of the
complexity effect.
(a) TFP index 2005=100, σ = 0.196, q = 2.15 and b = 1.08
(b) TFP index 2005=100, σ = 0.64, q = 1.29 and b = 0.38
Figure 2: Comparison between empirical series for χ (blue series) and entropy series for χ(A) (red series)
4 Model Setup
4.1 Households
We consider a model of overlapping generations (OLG). The young generation members supply one unit
of labor from which they earn wages wt and smooth their consumption, dividing their income between
the consumption in the current period c1t and in the second period c
1
t+1. Old generation members do
not work and make a living from their savings. Young individuals born in period 1 maximize utility
ut = log(c
1
t )+βlog(c
1
t+1), where β is the discount factor, subject to the following constraints: c
1
t = wt−st,
where st are savings, and c
2
t+1 = Rt+1st, where Rt+1 is the expected gross interest rate. This standard
OLG setup provides a well-known solution for per capita savings:
2This is the average annual growth rate of GDP per worker in the USA between 1950 and 2000, from the PWT 8.1.
3Note that we make a correspondence between “model” TFP and “data” TFP, without considering any further adjust-
ment.
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st =
β
1− βwt. (6)
Population has dimension L and grows at rate n. An exogenous growth rate may be appropriate
to include forces that enlarge the market while proving convenient in deriving analytical results and in
focusing the paper on the evolution of the technology side of economic activity (for a similar approach
concerning population dynamics, see Peretto, 2015).
4.2 Firms
A continuum of size 1 of competitive firms produces a homogeneous output using a Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy and employing physical capital and labor. In period t each firm i uses labor LY t(i) and intermediate
capital goods Kt(i) to produce output. Aggregating over all firms, we have aggregated output as:
Yt = A
σ
tK
α
t L
Y
t
1−α, (7)
where 0 < α < 1 is the share of physical capital in national income, 1 − α the share of labor in the
national income (as usual in the Cobb-Douglas settings) and σ is a parameter that governs the returns
to specialization. This allows us to proceed as Jones and Williams (2000) and Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth
(2005) and disentangle the effect of returns to specialization from the share of physical capital in the final
good production. For simplicity and without any loss of generality we assume that capital depreciates
fully within one generation. Profit maximization yields the following first-order conditions:
wt = (1− α) Yt
LYt
, (8)
pt = α
Yt
Kt
, (9)
where pt is the price of aggregated capital good. The composite capital good K is a CES aggregate of
quantities, xi, of specialized capital goods:
Kt = At
[
1
At
At∑
0
xαi
] 1
α
(10)
Using equations (9) and (10), we obtain the demand for individual varieties:
xi =
1
At
(
αY
Kαpi
) 1
1−α
(11)
With all varieties being produced in the same quantities, Kt = Atxit.
In the intermediate-goods sector (in which there is monopoly power) the firm maximizes profits pi =
pixi − rxi, from which we obtain the usual profit maximizing price, after substituting xi from equation
(11), as pi =
r
α . Using the profits equation from the intermediate-goods sector, the profits maximizing
price and equation (9) for the wage, we obtain the following expression for profits in the intermediate-goods
firm pit = (1− α)αYt/At.
The number of varieties At is produced according to equation (3). The free-entry condition into the
R&D sector (which employs labor) is wtLA = pit(1 + ψ)∆A , which equates the costs and the profits of
inventing (1 + ψ)∆A new units. Using equation (3), this yields wt
L
χ(At)
t
δAt
= pit. We equate both equations
for profits. Then we use equation (8) and the labor market clearing condition Lt = L
A
t + L
Y
t to obtain
the shares of labor employed in the R&D sector and in the final-goods sector as follows ( lat =
Lat
Lt
, where
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a = A,Y ):
lYt = min
{
1,
1
αδ
1
L1−χt
}
; lAt = max
{
0, 1− 1
αδ
1
L1−χt
}
(12)
5 Equilibrium dynamics: transitional dynamics and steady state
Using equations (6), (8), (7) and the per capita versions of the variables as small caps of the same letters,
such that yt =
Yt
Lt
is per capita income, kt =
Kt
Lt
is physical capital per capita and ct =
Ct
Lt
is consumption
per capita, the model can be summarized by the following equations:
st =
β
1 + β
wt (13)
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Lt+1
=
Lt
Lt+1
st (14)
wt = (1− α)yt/lYt (15)
yt = (At)
σ(lYt )
1−αkαt = ct + kt+1 (16)
Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt (17)
Inserting (13) into (14), then substituting wt from expression (15) and finally using (12) and (16), we
obtain the difference equation for physical capital per capita as follows:
kt+1 = a¯
(At)
σL
α(1−χ(At))
t k
α
t
1 + n
(18)
where a¯ = β(αδ)
α(1−α)
1+β . Note that when the complexity effect reaches χ(A) = 1 (one), then equation (18)
becomes free of scale effects. When χ(A) < 1 scale effects are present but decreasing as χ(A) increases.
Using equations (3), (12), and (18), we drive the two dynamic equations that describe growth dynamics
in this model:
∆kt = a¯
(At)
σL
α(1−χ(At))
t k
α
t
1 + n
− kt (19)
and
(1 + ψ)∆At = δ · (At)
(
L
1−χ(At)
t −
1
αδ
)
. (20)
Proposition 1 characterizes and states the conditions for a feasible steady state with endogenous growth.
Note that this model evolves to fully endogenous economic growth, depending only on the parameters
of the model, if χ(At) converges to a constant and population is constant. The scale effect vanishes if
χ(At) = 1 and becomes negative if χ(At) > 1. However, with an increasing population, the unique steady
state occurs with χ(At) = 1.
Proposition 1. In the steady state with increasing population, it must be that χ(At) = 1; consequently:
∆At
At
= 11+ψ (δ− 1/α), ∆ktkt = σ1−α 11+ψ (δ− 1/α) and there is a feasible steady state with endogenous growth
if and only if δα > 1.
Proof. Substitute χ(At) = 1 in equation (20) and in equation (19).
Using equations (19) and (20) and Lemma 1 we can conclude that for q > 1, the complexity effect
converges to a constant, allowing for a steady state with constant population and some (positive if b < q−1
or negative if b > q − 1) scale effects or to a steady state with growing population without scale effects
(if b = q − 1). Also, it indicates that for q ≤ 1, in the limit growth vanishes to zero. This means that
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the model is flexible enough to replicate different outcomes, depending on the quantitative calibration of
the R&D function. In the next sections we calibrate the model and evaluate quantitatively the plausible
behavior of the economy governed by this model.
6 Calibration and the evolution of this economy
We mostly followed Jones and Williams (2000) to calibrate the model. So we used α = 0.36, σ = 0.196 and
ψ = 1.648, as did they. We used β = 0.25, which replicates a gross domestic savings rate (as a percentage
of GDP) in the USA of 21% (average between 1974 and 2013). We replicate an annual average growth of
GDP per worker in the USA of 1.87% (average between 1950 and 2000) by setting the value of δ to 9. The
values that shape the entropy function for the complexity effect – equation (4) – come from the empirical
exercise shown in Section 3, thus q = 2.15 and b = 1.08. We also test the differences of the results to the
consideration of an alternative value of σ = 0.64, a value also considered in Jones and Williams (2000)
and for which we also show empirical results in Section 3. In this case, we consider δ = 3.965, q = 1.29,
and b = 0.38. We include a series for the growth rate of population nt from Maddison (2008), taking the
average growth rate for each generation of 20 years, considering the population values for 12 countries
in western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), the USA, and Australia. In the simulation exercise we
show results for the path of the economy in the post-industrial revolution, beginning in 1880. In this case
we want to replicate the main facts of the evolution of the economy in this period and will also compare
the evolution of the “model” series with “data” series. Note that as we do not make any assumption on
the values that govern the entropy R&D function χ(A) our objective is also to replicate the empirical
value for χ(A), in 2000, which is tending to one.
6.1 From the Industrial Revolution to the present days
In this subsection we will present the results of our simulations in our benchmark model. We compare the
series for TFP growth, GDP per capita growth and GDP per capita levels, and the complexity (entropy)
effect that emerges from the model with the series found in data. For GDP per capita growth and GDP
per capita levels in data,4 we use series for the USA and the UK (from the Penn World Tables 8.1) and
series for the UK from Clark (2009). For TFP growth we use series for the USA from Baier et. al. (2000)
and for the UK from Clark (2009). Finally, we compare the model complexity effect with the available
observations we have for the same effect (also shown in Section 3).
Figure 3 shows our main results. The model replicates an acceleration of TFP growth which tends to
stabilize over the XXth century. It seems that the model tends to show an acceleration of TFP growth
that happens too soon relative to data. Especially when comparing TFP model series with data series,
it is worth noting that the model has not the sufficient ingredients to replicate the empirical effect of
the Great Depression between the 1920 and 1940 generations.5 Despite that, the model replicates quite
well the evolution of the growth rate of per capita output, showing clearly the acceleration due to the
industrial revolution. Regarding the level of per capita GDP, the model almost mimics the evolution of
GDP shown by Clark (2009) for the UK being slightly below the estimates for the USA. Figure 3d shows
that the evolution of the complexity effects closely replicates the data we obtained for this effect in the
last half of the XXth century. It is interesting to note that a lower complexity effect has two reinforcing
4In the case of the level of GDP per capita we normalize the data value to match the model value in 1880. Growth rates
are gross growth rates for one generation, 20 years.
5A stylized model of endogenous growth as this one intends to replicate the long-run stylized facts (also those affecting
the transitional dynamics) and not cyclical phenomena. In fact, most countries have returned to their long-run trend of
long-run growth after the great depression.
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(a) TFP growth; g TFP 1 is from Baier et. al. (2000)
and g TFP 2 is from Clark (2009).
(b) GDP per capita levels; Y(t) data UK and Y(t) data
USA are from PWT 8.1 and Y(t) data Clark is data for
the UK from Clark (2009)
(c) GDP per capita growth rates; gY(t) data UK and
gY(t) data USA are from PWT 8.1 and gY(t) data Clark
is data for the UK from Clark (2009)
(d) Complexity Effect χ(A)
Figure 3: Evolution of the main “model” series (blue line series) and comparison with “data” series
(σ = 0.196, q = 2.15 and b = 1.08, k0 = 0.073, L0 = 0.8, A0 = 0.5).
effects: while it increases TFP growth (at higher than plausible rates), it also increases capital growth
due to a stronger scale effect, as the lower the complexity effect the higher the scale effect on growth.
It is worth noting that with some adjustment in the parameters of the complexity function we can
replicate the productivity slowdown after the 1980’s and the main pattern related to the evolution of the
other variables. In Figure 4 we show the evolution of the main variables in the economy for q = 1.1 and
b = 0.206. In this figure the pattern of the evolution of TFP growth is closer to the data series (which
now seem to replicate closer the long-run effect of the Great Depression), while the evolution of GDP per
capita growth rates, and GDP per capita levels are again close to the data. The complexity effect χ(A)
approaches the value of 1 in 2000, also close to the available data.
Next we present an exercise with the alternative value for σ = 0.64. In this case there is a slowdown
in TFP growth rate in the late XXth century (but not a decrease in TFP growth as some of the data
series show). Overall, TFP growth, GDP per capita growth and GDP per capita levels predicted by the
model are very close to the data series. The poorest prediction of the model in this case is that of the
complexity effect, although increasing considerablyt from the early XXth century on, is far from the 0.9
value that we found in the estimates based on the data.
In the next section we will present counterfactual exercises to evaluate the importance of considering
a varying state-dependent complexity effect to approximate the transitional dynamics of the model with
the data series.
6.1.1 Counterfactual exercises with no varying complexity effect
In this section we wish to show the relevance of considering a time-varying complexity effect in the R&D
technology, which implies that the scale effects gradually vanish. First we assume that the complexity
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(a) TFP growth; g TFP 1 is from Baier et. al. (2000)
and g TFP 2 is from Clark (2009).
(b) GDP per capita levels; Y(t) data UK and Y(t) data
USA are from PWT 8.1 and Y(t) data Clark is data for
the UK from Clark (2009)
(c) GDP per capita growth rates; gY(t) data UK and
gY(t) data USA are from PWT 8.1 and gY(t) data Clark
is data for the UK from Clark (2009)
(d) Complexity Effect χ(A)
Figure 4: Evolution of the main “model” series (blue line series) and comparison with “data” series
(σ = 0.196, q = 1.1 and b = 0.206, k0 = 0.073, L0 = 0.8, A0 = 0.5).
effect χ(A) is always one, which implies that there are no scale effects throughout history. Second, we
consider that χ(A) = 0 always, which implies maximum scale effects throughout history. Both exercises
show us the plausibility of considering a time-varying and increasing complexity effect in R&D. In the first
case (Figure 6a), the main implausible prediction of the model is that the growth of TFP would always be
constant from 1880 to 2000. In the second exercise (Figure 6b) the growth of TFP is always much higher
than the data show, and instead of slowing down after 1980, it increases a great deal. In 2000 the growth
rate of TFP would be implausibly high (near an annualized rate of 3.53%, while in data it is close to an
annualized rate of 0.9%).6 Additionally, by assumption we are imposing a complexity effect of zero (0),
which is counterfactual with the evidence we showed in Section 3.
In the next subsection we introduce the change that R&D may benefit from knowledge diffusion across
borders (as e.g. in Bottazzi and Peri, 2007). Our aim is to test the robustness of our results to this
change in the setup, as the use of foreign ideas could diminish the importance of the complexity effect
and eventually overcome it.
6.1.2 International knowledge diffusion
In this subsection we change the R&D production function to
(1 + ψ)(At+1 −At) = δ · (At)g (Awt )µ ·
LAt
L
χ(At)
t
, (21)
6As the main implausible features of considering a non-varying complexity effect come from the behavior of the TFP
growth, we only include figures for this series. However, other figures are available upon request. We should note that the
changes in the assumptions about the complexity effect have no effect in the steady-state growth rate of 1.87% that we
replicate.
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(a) TFP growth; g TFP 1 is from Baier et. al. (2000)
and g TFP 2 is from Clark (2009).
(b) GDP per capita levels; Y(t) data UK and Y(t) data
USA are from PWT 8.1 and Y(t) data Clark is data for
the UK from Clark (2009)
(c) GDP per capita growth rates; gY(t) data UK and
gY(t) data USA are from PWT 8.1 and gY(t) data Clark
is data for the UK from Clark (2009)
(d) Complexity Effect χ(A)
Figure 5: Evolution of the main “model” series (blue line series) and comparison with “data” series
(σ = 0.64, q = 1.29 and b = 0.38, k0 = 0.073, L0 = 0.8, A0 = 0.5).
(a) TFP growth with χ(A) = 1; g TFP 1 is from Baier
et. al. (2000) and g TFP 2 is from Clark (2009).
(b) TFP growth with χ(A) = 0; g TFP 1 is from Baier
et. al. (2000) and g TFP 2 is from Clark (2009).
Figure 6: Evolution of the main “model” series (blue line series) and comparison with “data” TFP series
(σ = 0.196, imposed χ(A), k0 = 0.073, L0 = 0.8, A0 = 0.5).
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where in addition to the specification in equation (3) we include domestic spillovers g, following Jones
(1995), and Awt , following Bottazzi and Peri (2007), representing an exogenous and foreign stock of ideas
influencing the production of domestic new technologies.7 There is also a degree of international spillovers
measured by µ. In order to measure Awt we use the stock of patents issued to non-residents in the USA
(registered in the US patent office). First we set Aw0 equal to the data ratio between patents issued to
non-residents in the USA and patents issued to residents in the USA in 1880 (the first observation in the
simulations), which was 2.3875%. Then, we calculate the growth rate of Awt as the growth rate of patents
issued to non-residents in the USA in the US patent office. We set g = 0.864, which is the highest value
in Jones and Williams (2000) – a value that is also consistent with empirical estimates in Pessoa (2005)
and Porter and Stern (2000) – and use an approximate value to the most robust estimates in Bottazzi
and Peri (2007: Table 4) – a coefficient of 0.2 – to set µ = 0.0272.8 Figure 7 shows the results.
We can observe that this extension allows us to improve the replication of data time-series, namely
those of GDP per capita (now more similar to the evolution of the USA data) and growth rates of GDP
per capita. In fact, the simulation mimics quite well the final growth rates (both for GDP per capita and
TFP) in 2000 and plots a slight recovery between 1980 and 2000. Again it also mimics the final values
(for the three generations for which we have data between 1960 and 2000) of the complexity effect. Thus,
we conclude that the model modification to account for foreign knowledge diffusion does not diminish the
accuracy of the model in replicating the complexity effect, while allowing for a better replication of the
final growth rates and approximating the evolution of GDP per capita to the USA data series. However,
as a drawback, TFP slowdown begins too early in history (after 1920) and the model tends to show too
high GDP per capita growth rates in the middle of the XXth century (between 1920 and 1960).
(a) TFP growth; g TFP 1 is from Baier et. al.
(2000) and g TFP 2 is from Clark (2009).
(b) GDP per capita levels; Y(t) data UK and Y(t)
data USA are from PWT 8.2 and Y(t) data Clark is
data for the UK from Clark (2009)
(c) GDP per capita growth rates; gY(t) data UK
and gY(t) data USA are from PWT 8.1 and gY(t)
data Clark is data for the UK from Clark (2009)
(d) Complexity Effect χ(A)
Figure 7: Evolution of the main “model” series (blue line series) and comparison with “data” series
(σ = 0.196, q = 2.15 and b = 1.08, φ = 0.864, µ = 0.0272, k0 = 0.00004, L0 = 0.8, A0 = 0.5).
7The deduction of the model with this change in the R&D production function is presented in the Appendix.
8µ = (1− φ)× coefficient.
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7 An extended model to the very long run
The literature on Unified Growth Theory offers an insightful approach to economic growth in the very
long run and its gradual take-off, by looking into the historical context of the pre-take-off and take-off
phases of today’s most developed countries, from the 18th century to the early 20th century. Galor and
other authors’ (e.g., Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; see Galor, 2005, for a review) analytical
results address the transition between distinct growth regimes – Malthusian, post-Malthusian and modern
growth regimes – exploring the interaction between population growth and fertility rates (demographic
transition), human-capital accumulation and output and per capita output growth. A recent strand of the
literature shows that the gradual take-off of the economic growth rate can be complementarily explained
by a mechanism centered on technological change, knowledge diffusion and the role of firms and en-
trepreneurs. For instance, Strulik (2009, 2014) focuses on the interaction of physical-capital accumulation
and knowledge diffusion, while shutting down the interaction between demographic and economic forces
and their impact on fertility and human capital. It is assumed that capital-embodied (learning-by-doing)
technological change improves the transmission of knowledge by reducing the effective distance between
firms. In this way capital accumulation improves the appropriation of knowledge through increased net-
work or globalization effects. Then, more knowledge spillovers lead to higher factor productivity, which
in turn, triggers more investment and higher growth.
Peretto (2015) explores a Schumpeterian model with two types of innovation activity (vertical and
horizontal) in order to stress the role of forces at the industry level, the firms’ and entrepreneurs’ incentives
to innovate and how they respond to changes in aggregate market size. Peretto addresses, in particular,
the historical evidence concerning the transition from the first to the second Industrial Revolution by
analyzing the conditions under which innovation is initially carried out by individual entrepreneurs who
market it by starting up a new firm, while, later, innovation is mainly carried out by incumbent firms
performing in-house R&D activities. Strulik (2009, 2014) does not remove scale effects in the steady state,
while Peretto (2015) sterilizes scale effects in the steady state provided that both types of innovation
occur, as in, e.g., Peretto (1998) and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), thereby generating non-scale
fully-endogenous growth.
In this section we follow the second strand of the literature and extend our model to replicate the
economy in the very long run, from A.D. 1 to the present days, including the Industrial Revolution and
the subsequent take-off, the emergence of R&D-based economic activities and intensive learning activities,
all of which will contribute to economic growth.
In this model there will be a learning mechanism as in Strulik (2014), as well as spillovers in R&D
that are positively related to network effects related to physical capital, also present in Strulik (2009).
These mechanisms, as in Strulik (2009, 2014), intend to represent the effect of globalization.9 To this
framework we also add our time-varying state-dependent complexity mechanism linked to entropy in the
R&D technology. This more complete model should allow us to replicate the very long-run evolution of
the economy, while incorporating a mechanism that tends to dissolve scale effects in modern times but
allows for them in more ancient historical periods.
7.1 The Model
The main model is enlarged to consider a more complete production function such that per capita output
can be written as:
yt = AL
ζ
tAR
σ
t k
α
t l
Y
t
1−α, (22)
9Because of this we do not include knowledge diffusion incorporating foreign ideas into the R&D production function, as
we did in Section 6.1.2. However, adding that mechanism of knowledge diffusion does not change our main results.
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where AL represents knowledge accumulated by experience or learning-by-doing, such that:
ALt = A¯k
g(kt)
t , (23)
where A¯ is the level of learning that is independent on the physical capital, g(k) is a time-varying state-
dependent network or globalization effect, based on the small world theory (e.g. in Strulik, 2014), and is
given by:
g(kt) = 1−
(
ω
ω + exp(kt)
)3
.10 (24)
Furthermore, R&D is also enlarged to include spillovers that are modelled as network effects also given
by equation (24):
(1 + ψ)(ARt+1 −ARt) = δ · (ARt)g(kt) ·
LAt
L
χ(ARt)
t
. (25)
Spillovers in R&D that are less than one are common in the endogenous growth literature since Jones
(1995). These effects had been introduced with the motivation of nullifying the scale effects that would
arise if spillovers were complete (i.e. g = 1). However, the way Strulik (2009) introduced the R&D
spillovers in g(k) in the model implies that scale effects may be absent in the transitional dynamics but
should increase and be maximum when g(kt) = 1, exactly in the steady state (or in the fully developed
economy). This is exactly in opposition to historical evidence according to which scale effects seem to
have been present in certain historical periods, but tend to be null (or very small) in the fully developed
economies of modern times. Thus our complexity effect modelled as entropy is again essential to decrease
and eventually nullify the scale effects in the fully developed economy, while allowing for their existence
in the past.11 Using (22), (23), (25) and the associated free-entry condition wt
L
χ(At)
t
δA
g(kt)
t
= pit and following
the same steps as in Section 5 (using again (13), (14), (15) and (17), and then using the identity in (16)),
we obtain the dynamic equation for physical capital per capita :
∆kt = a¯
(At)
σ−α(1−g(kt))Lα(1−χ(At))t k
α+g(kt)ζ
t
1 + n
− kt (26)
where a¯ = β(αδ)
α(1−α)
1+β A¯
ζ . Note that (26) highlights again that a steady state with a growing population
can be attained when χ(A) = 1.
7.2 Calibration
Following the same steps as in the benchmark model (Section 6), we use both literature values and
data to calibrate the parameters in the model. Thus, we continue to use the same values for the gains
of specialization (σ=0.196), the share of capital (α=0.36), the creative destruction (ψ = 1.648), and
β = 0.25, which replicates a gross domestic savings rate (as a percentage of GDP) in the USA of 21%
(average between 1974 and 2013) . We infer the data for TFP level as before (using output and capital per
worker from PWT) with the difference that now the TFP level is AL
ζ
tAR
σ
t . We obtain ARt from the US
Patent Office series for patents issued in the NBER classifications 1 to 5, which are supposedly the most
intensive in intentional research (chemical, computers and communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical
and Electronics, and Mechanical)12 – see Marco et. al., 2015. These data are used to disentangle the
series for ARt and ALt. We use the growth rate of capital per worker and the growth rate of patents (both
calculated in the time interval from 1950 and 2000) to obtain ζ = 0.389, using also the calibrated values
10We rely on Strulik (2014) for detailed foundation for this functional form. In particular, it can be derived from first
principles under the assumption that the economy is a small world network in which the number of long-distance links
depends positively on the capital stock. It tends to unity as k goes to infinity and leaves only one parameter ω to calibrate.
11Note that when g(k) = χ(A) = 1, scale effects are absent.
12From the total number of patents issued, this excludes classifications 7 (others), 8 (not classified) and 9 (missing).
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for α and σ. We adjust δ = 4.39 such that the model replicates a steady-state growth rate of 1.87% (the
same procedure as before). Population growth rates are again the 20 year average population growth from
A.D. 1 to A.D. 2000 from Maddison (2008).
Finally, transforming equations (23) and (25) to their log version, we use the following recursive system
to obtain the state-dependent functions g and χ:
g =
lnALt − lnA¯
lnkt
χ =
lnδ + g · lnARt + lnLAt − ln(∆ARt+1)
lnLt
To obtaint empirical estimates for g and χ over time, we consider the calibrated values of δ and A¯ and
the time series data for AL, AR, k, LA and L. We follow Strulik (2014) in adjusting for the scale in which
the learning variable is measured in the data up to a constant µ, such that the learning variable in the
model should be the learning variable in data multiplied by µ. As before, we consider indices of learning
AL and technological knowledge AR to be indices with the value 100 in 2000. Then, we proceed as before
and adjust q and b such that the theoretical series for χ approximate the empirical series. We plot the
series in Figure 8, obtained with b = 0.919 and q = 1.961, which we will use in the baseline simulations
in this Section. Also as in Strulik (2014), ω is adjusted such that we obtain the best possible historical
adjustment.
(a) TFP index (2005=100), γ = 0.196, q = 1.961 and b = 0.919
Figure 8: Comparison between empirical series for χ (blue series) and entropy series for χ(A) (red series)
7.3 From A.D. 1 to present days
In this section we present simulations of the extended model to replicate the main facts of the economic
evolution from A.D. 1 to A.D. 2000 Figures 9 and 10 show the evolution of the main variables. In Figure
9a the globalization effect is plotted. Interestingly, the globalization effect is smoothly increasing until
the middle age, doubling between A.D. 1 and near A.D. 1000 Historically, this period corresponds to the
christianization of Europe, the decadence of the eastern Roman Empire, the rise of the Arab Empire,
which flourished from Iberia to China, and the Vikings expeditions. From near 1000 to the middle of
XVth century, globalization stagnated on a level near 0.4. This corresponds to the Middle-Ages, when
barriers to trade and to free thinking took place all over Europe. After a slight increase in globalization
due to the first exploration voyages (e.g., those of Columbus and Vasco da Gama) between 1400 and
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1460, there is a drop in globalization. Although this continues to be an epoch of maritime explorations
(e.g., Magellan’s voyages), at the same time, reformation and counter-reformation shaped Europe, and the
Turkish hegemony on the east decreased trade through the eastern route to Asia, while the new maritime
routes had not reached their maximum capacity yet.
Interestingly, it is after 1580 that globalization begins to expand rapidly. This corresponds to the
entrance of the Dutch and the English in the world trade maritime routes, defying and eventually defeating
the Iberian countries.13 Between 1820 and 1840, there is a period of falling globalization, which historically
corresponds to the collapse of the Iberian empires in the South and Central America, the consequent
independence of several countries in that region of the globe, and protectionist practices in the USA and
Canada. After 1840, a new age of growing globalization emerges and which reaches the maximum in 1940.
This epoch corresponds to the maximum extension of the British empire, the emergence of the USA as
a global power, and to the first and second Industrial Revolutions. Figures 9b, 9d and 9f show that the
take-off for modern growth is situated around 1840, with the emergence of R&D as an intentional activity
and which is highly intensified after 1920 (see historical evidence e.g. in Mokyr, 2005). The emergence of
learning-driven knowledge began earlier than intentional R&D knowledge, with a positive evolution since
the early XVIth century, but with a great intensification on the eve of the XIXth century. The evolution
of labor allocated to R&D activities (Figure 9e) confirms that allocation to intentional R&D began in
1820, but by a very small amount. Figure 9d confirms that this effort only implied a significant change
in technological knowledge, led by intentional R&D, after 1860. Figure 9e shows the evolution of the
complexity effect, conducted by our entropy formulation. The complexity effect is positive only in 1840
and increases steadily until 1920, after which it grows slowly and eventually stabilizes around one in 2000.
Figure 10 shows the evolution of the economy in growth rates. All the changes in growth rates before
the emergence of the Industrial Revolution are driven by changes in population growth, implying that
the model does well in replicating a large period of stagnation with Malthusian effects due to population
growth. In fact, sustained growth begins only after 1840. The model replicates a slight decrease in the
growth of technology (Figure 10c) in the transition between the first and the second Industrial Revolution
at the end of the XIXth century and beginning of the XXth and a productivity growth slowdown after 1960,
roughly corresponding to the productivity slowdown usually verified after the 1970s. It is worth noting
that the productivity slowdown shown in Figure 10c is consistent with an ever increasing labor in R&D
activities (see also Figure 9e). The growth rate of physical capital (Figure 10a) also slows down between
1940 and 1960 (roughly corresponding to the war period), while the growth rate of learning drops (Figure
10d) are more pronounced after 1920 and 1960 (including the historical periods of the Great Depression
and World War II, respectively). These different growth rates implied an always increasing per capita
output growth rate from 1840 and 1940, which then tends to slow down until 2000 (Figure 10b).
When comparing the model series with data series, which we show in Figure 11 for output per capita
and growth rate of output per capita, we conclude that the model behaves quite well in predicting the
timing of the take-off to modern growth and also the levels of output per capita. In fact, Figures 11a and
11c show that the evolution of output per capita in the model is in between the UK data and the US data
from the Maddison Project and almost mimics the evolution of the UK data from Clark (2009). Also in
growth rates (Figures 11b and 11d), the model replicates the evolution in the data quite well, with the
take-off in the middle of the XIXth century and the slowdown after the 1960s. It is worth noting that the
smoothing in growth happens close to the period in which empirical series also tend to stabilize. Note that
this economy displays a very small scale effect, as the limit of χ(A) is 0.956296. This also means that the
economy will not stabilize per capita growth if population remains growing. A slight change in the value
of q to 1.919 (or b to 0.969) would imply that the limit of χ(A) would be one and no scale effect would be
present in the current economy. Thus, growth would stabilize even with population growth. As we wish
13The defeat of the invincible Armada occurred in 1588.
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to remain tied to the empirical estimates of the complexity effect parameters, we present the results with
the precise values that come from the calibration exercise. However, note that a (slight) change in these
parameters that would yield a fully-endogenous steady-state would not change our transitional dynamics
results. Additionally, this slight change in the parameter q would emphasize the productivity slowdown
after the second half of the XXth century.14
(a) Globalization Effect g(k) (b) Physical Capital per capita
(c) Complexity Effect χ(A) (d) Technological knowledge
(e) Labor in R&D Activities (f) Learning-by-doing knowledge
Figure 9: Evolution of the main “model” series (σ = 0.169, q = 1.961 and b = 0.919, k0 = 4.2, L0 = 0.1,
AR0 = 1, A¯ = 1000, ω = 742.734390035).
14Results are available upon request. In this slightly different exercise both the level and the growth rates of output per
capita would be as close to the data as in the Figure 10.
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(a) Growth rate of physical capital per capita (b) Growth rate of output per capita
(c) Growth rate of technological knowledge (d) Growth rate of learning-by-doing knowledge
Figure 10: Evolution of the main “model” series (σ = 0.169, q = 1.961 and b = 0.919, k0 = 4.2, L0 = 0.1,
AR0 = 1, A¯ = 1000, ω = 742.734390035).
(a) Output per capita (A.D. 1 - A.D. 2000) (b) growth rate of output per capita (A.D. 1 - A.D. 2000
(c) Output per capita (A.D. 1700 - A.D. 2000) (d) growth rate of output per capita (A.D. 1700 - A.D. 2000)
Figure 11: Evolution of the main “model” series (blue line series) (same as in Figure 10) and comparison
with “data” series for the USA (source: Maddison Project, Bolt and Zaden, 2014, green line series), for
the UK (source: Maddison Project, Bolt and Zaden, 2014, red line series) and for the UK (source: Clark,
2009, purple line series); output per capita in the data is set equal to the value in the model for the first
observation available in the data (for the UK, Maddison Project the first observation is A.D. 1; for the
UK, Clark data the first observation is A.D. 1200; for the USA, Maddison Project the first observation is
A.D. 1640).
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In the following subsection, we replicate a more pronounced productivity slowdown and simultaneously
approximate the predicted series for GDP per capita to the data series for the US.
7.3.1 The Productivity Slowdown
In order to replicate a more pronounced productivity slowdown in the post-1970 decade, we change the
calibration of the complexity effect. This is intended also to show the flexibility of our formulation to
replicate different historical scenarios, especially those linked with productivity evolution and the take-off
to the modern growth regime based on physical capital accumulation and R&D. In fact, Figure 12 shows
that both labor allocated to R&D and productivity growth linked with technological knowledge decrease
after 1960. Figure 12b shows that the growth rate of technological knowledge in 2000 would be as low
as the 1940s’ values. As in the benchmark model, the adjustment in the complexity function introduced
in this paper is sufficient to mimic the productivity slowdown in the last quarter of the XX th century.
This phenomenon is more pronounced in this extension than in the previous one because in this case
the complexity effect χ(A) approaches one rapidly and does not tend to become constant, as occurred
in the previous simulation. The evolution of other variables and the take-off timing are similar to those
presented in Figures 9 and 10, so we do not reproduce the time-series for the other variables.
Figure 13 compares the evolution of output per capita in the data and in the model. We can thus
observe that the model is quite precise in mimicking the evolution of GDP per capita both when looking
at the larger time span from A.D. 1 to A.D. 2000 and when we focus on the period post-1700.
(a) labor allocated to R&D. (b) growth rate of technological knowledge.
Figure 12: The productivity slowdown (σ = 0.169, q = 1 and b = 0.21, k0 = 4.2, L0 = 0.1, AR0 = 1,
A¯ = 1000, ω = 742.734390035).
(a) Output per capita (A.D. 1- A.D. 2000). (b) Output per capita (A.D. 1700 - A.D. 2000).
Figure 13: The productivity slowdown: Evolution of the main “model” series (blue line series) (same as
in Figure 10) and comparison with “data” series for the USA (source: Maddison Project, Bolt and Zaden,
2014, green line series), for the UK (source: Maddison Project, Bolt and Zaden, 2014, red line series)
and for the UK (source: Clark, 2009, purple line series); output per capita in the model is made equal
to the value in data for the first observation available in data (for the UK, Maddison Project the first
observation is A.D. 1; for the UK, Clark data the first observation is A.D. 1200; for the USA, Maddison
Project the first observation is A.D. 1640).
20
7.4 Futuristic Scenarios
In this section we extend the previous scenarios to the future and conclude that the model predicts a
significant slowdown of the economy (in per capita output) after 2000. In fact, growth rates will only
tend to increase again in around 2200. According to demographic projections, population growth rates
will tend to stagnate as fertility rates decrease and tend to stabilize at around 2.1 children per woman.
We use Maddison’s (2008) projections for population until 2030 (using population for the same countries
as before) and then steadily decrease population growth by 0.01 percentage points in each 20-year period
until it reaches zero in 3020. Figure 14 shows the results, plotting the main variables and emphasizing
the growth rates time path. The pattern for the globalization effect g(k) almost mimics that presented in
Figure 9a with the level of globalization remaining constant at one after 1940. Research effort will increase
until the year 3000, when it will stabilize. The complexity effect χ(A) stabilizes around 2000, as already
mentioned when describing Figure 9. The most interesting features of this simulation are related to the
evolution of growth rates. In fact, after the physical-capital growth rate recovery after World War II, it
will reach the maximum in 2020 and then decrease steadily until 2160 (this corresponds to a drop of the
annual growth rate from 2.36% to 2.20%). After 2160 and until 3000, physical capital will increase steadily
from an annual average of 2.20% to 2.52%, after which this growth rate will decrease marginally until it
stabilizes (see Figure 14b). After a decrease in technological knowledge (AR) growth after 1960 (annual
growth rate of 2.94%), that will continue until 2120, there will be a recovery until the year 3000, from an
annual growth rate of 2.74% to 3.21% (see Figure 14d). Due to the growth pattern of physical capital
(Figure 14b) and learning-by-doing (not shown) which are very similar, the per capita output growth rate
(Figure 14f), after lowering down between 1960 and 2000, it will decrease from 2.70% (in 2000) to 2.46%
(in 2220) and then recover to 2.56% around the year 2660, and then will again slightly decrease to 2.52%
around the year 3000.
However, for an economy that attained the best growth rates in 2000 (for instance the value for
the UK in the 1980s generation, reaching an annual average of 3% according to the Maddison Project
data), the economy should behave more like the simulation in Section 7.3.1, which also replicates well the
productivity slowdown after the 1970s. If we extend this simulated economy to the future, assuming that
when χ(A) reaches one it will remain there, we obtain more pronounced oscillations in the growth rates.
In this case, the output per capita growth rate will experience a huge and continuous drop from 2000 to
around 2900 from an annual growth rate of near 3.47% to 1.88% (tending then to 1.87%, the steady-state
value) – see Figure 15f. This drop is explained by a productivity slowdown due to R&D from 1960 to 2040
(Figure 15d), which stabilizes afterwards, and a slower fall in the physical capital and learning growth
rates, lasting from the year 2000 to nearly the year 3000. Figure 15 shows the evolution of these variables
in this alternative exercise.
Finally, if we are willing to allow for negative scale effects in the future, we may relax the assumption
according to which when χ(A) reaches one, it remains there indefinetly, and instead let χ(A) grow to
levels higher than 1, as it happens if b > 1 − q or q = 1. In this case, the evolution of the economy will
be much worse, with the growth rate dropping to zero as the population growth also goes to zero (near
the year 3000). Moreover, R&D will end in the year 2160 and as a consequence technological knowledge
will stabilize. Thus, the economy would return to a regime in which growth is driven solely by physical-
capital accumulation and knowledge driven by learning. This should occur between 2160 and 3000, after
which the economy would stagnate. This scenario is presented in Figure 16. Such a scenario seems to be
excluded by our empirical estimates of the parameters of the complexity effect function, which, on the
contrary, seems to point to a value of χ(A) that tends to one or less.
Interestingly, whatever the scenario, the model may explain the decreasing growth of the world economy
after 2000, which is due entirely to the complexity effect (note that the simulations in Strulik (2014) did
not show this effect). According to the model, after the decrease in technological knowledge growth
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(a) Globalization Effect g(k) (b) Growth rate of Physical Capital per capita
(c) Labor in R&D Activities (d) Growth rate of Technological knowledge
(e) Complexity Effect χ(A) (f) Growth rate of Output per capita
Figure 14: Evolution of the main “model” series (σ = 0.169, q = 1.961 and b = 0.919, k0 = 4.2, L0 = 0.1,
AR0 = 1, A¯ = 1000, ω = 742.734390035.)
after the 1960s, physical capital and learning-by-doing, and eventually output per capita experience a
subsequent fall in growth rates after the year 2000. In the model the process of learning-by-doing is
almost entirely determined by the evolution of physical capital, due to the network effect, thus resulting
in very similar time paths for the two variables. The R&D productivity slowdown is a consequence of
the rise in the complexity effect and happens in the generation that follows the maximum value for the
complexity effect. This slowdown affects income growth, which thus affects savings and physical-capital
accumulation, eventually leading to its slowdown and drop after the year 2000. As the network effect
g(k) stabilizes before this period, this will no longer affect R&D and thus R&D productivity will stabilize.
Although the slowdown of the 2000s has been attributed mainly to financial frictions and inefficiencies
(which our stylized model does not incorporate), some authors began to question the sole financial roots
of the crisis. For instance, in Kasparov et. al. (2012), the authors point out that the collapse of advanced-
country growth is not merely a result of the financial crisis. At its root, they argue, these countries’
weakness reflects secular stagnation in technology and innovation. Most recently, Brinca et. al. (2016)
– in a forthcoming chapter in the Handbook of Macroeconomics – had pointed to the efficiency wedge
(measured by A in the final good production function) as the main source of the great recession at the
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(a) Globalization Effect g(k) (b) Growth rate of Physical Capital per capita
(c) Labor in R&D Activities (d) Growth rate of Technological knowledge
(e) Complexity Effect χ(A) (f) Growth rate of Output per capita
Figure 15: Evolution of the main “model” series (σ = 0.169, q = 1 and b = 0.21, k0 = 4.2, L0 = 0.1,
AR0 = 1, A¯ = 1000, ω = 742.734390035, max(χ(A)) = 1).
end of the 2000s’ decade.
8 Conclusions
We introduce the concept of entropy into the endogenous growth theory to describe the complexity effect
that tends to dilute the market-size effect in fully developed economies. Firms in fully developed economies
face the intensive use of producer services, such as equipment repair and maintenance, transportation and
communication services, engineering and legal supports, accounting, advertising, and financial services.
At this stage, complexity in dealing with such a variety of services may exert as much pressure as the
positive effect of the market size. The concept of entropy fits well into a complexity effect that is state-
dependent and time-varying. We relate the complexity function to the number of varieties that firms in the
industrialized world have to deal with. Thus, as it seems to be suggested by empirical evidence, this allows
for the market-size or scale effects to be present in historical periods and to slowly vanish until the present
day economies. We test this hypothesis against the available data and show that the entropy function, as
a complexity effect, adjusts well to the complexity effect estimated by taking the R&D functional forms
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(a) Globalization Effect g(k) (b) Physical Capital per capita
(c) Labor in R&D Activities (d) Technological knowledge
(e) Complexity Effect χ(A) (f) Learning-by-doing knowledge
Figure 16: Evolution of the main “model” series (σ = 0.169, q = 1 and b = 0.21, k0 = 4.2, L0 = 0.1,
AR0 = 1, A¯ = 1000, ω = 742.734390035).
of the model to the data. The estimated complexity effect is increasing and reaches values close to one
near the year 2000, which tends to support the “fully-endogenous growth theory”without (or with very
small) scale effects, as a good description of the fully developed economy.
We devise an R&D-based endogenous growth model with a state-dependent time-varying complexity
effect and formally obtain its transitional dynamics. Then, we use the adjustment of the complexity effect
to the data to calibrate the parameters that shape that function. Together with literature references and
the data, we fully calibrate the model and simulate its transitional dynamics for the period after the
Industrial Revolution. We note that the state-dependent time-varying effect linked with the concept of
entropy is essential to replicate the post-Industrial Revolution evolution of the economy, both in levels
and in growth rates. In particular, it replicates well the evolution of GDP per capita and growth rates in
the UK, as well as a varying TFP growth, which can mimic the productivity slowdown in the last part of
the XXth century. Furthermore, the simulated model replicates the final values of the complexity effect
obtained from the empirical estimates.
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Finally, we devise a model that intends to replicate the very long-run evolution of the economy from
A.D. 1 to A.D. 2000. We consider a spillover or network effect that is state-dependent (borrowed from
Strulik, 2014) together with our complexity effect based on the entropy concept. The model’s transitional
dynamics are derived. Then, we calibrate it to simulate the evolution of the economy. We discover that
the model does well in predicting a take-off from the “Malthusian” stage to the post-industrial revolution
stage. It is important to note that the globalization effect simulation fits well on historical evolution, with
a stagnation during the middle-ages, a first push with the European expansion and empires in the XVII th
centuries and a final rise during the final part of the XIXth century and the eve of the XXth century. The
complexity effect rises with the intentional R&D activity that emerged in the XIX th century. We show
that the state-dependent time-varying effect led by entropy is again essential to replicate a productivity
slowdown in the final part of the last century. Additionally, the model predicts well the evolution of
the levels of GDP per capita and their growth rates. Some futuristic scenarios show that the model
accommodates very different evolutions of the future economy. If the model replicates a mild growth rate
in 2000 (similar to those in the UK), then the evolution should be positive, after a very small adjustment
following 2000, with a slow and gradual increase in growth rates in the future centuries. However, if the
model replicates a high current growth rate (similar to those of the USA), then the post-2000 adjustment
is more dramatic in growth rates. Finally, in a more implausible scenario in which the complexity effect
rises above one, the economy may stagnate in the very long future with R&D activity tending to vanish
within the next two centuries. This would imply that after that time, the economy would return to a long
period in which physical capital and learning-by-doing would be the only sources of growth, such as what
occurred before the intentional R&D emerged in the XIXth century. Whatever the scenario in the future,
the state-dependent time-varying complexity effect seems to contribute to the explanation of the growth
slowdown that happened in the current 2000-2020 generation.
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A Appendix: the model with international knowledge diffusion
Using (16), (21) and the associated free-entry condition wt
L
χ(At)
t
δAgt (A
w
t )
µ = pit, and following the steps as in
Section 5 (using again equations (15)), we first obtain the share of labor allocated to R&D and the final
good production as:
lYt = min
{
1,
1
αδ
1
L1−χt
A1−gt
(Awt )
µ
}
; lAt = max
{
0, 1− 1
αδ
1
L1−χt
A1−gt
(Awt )
µ
}
(A.1)
Inserting (13) into (14), then replacing wt with expression (15) and finally using (A.1) and (16), we
obtain the difference equation for physical capital as follows:
∆kt = a¯
(At)
σ−α(1−g)(Awt )
αµL
α(1−χ(At))
t k
α
t
1 + n
− kt (A.2)
where a¯ = β(αδ)
α(1−α)
1+β .
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